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INTRODUCTION 
 Congress enacted 36 U.S.C. § 186, “An Act to provide that all United States Currency 
shall bear the inscription ‘In God We Trust’”1 (hereinafter referred to as the “Inscription 
Mandate” or the “Mandate”) in 1955, and it has been a source of divisiveness ever since. 
Consequently, many Atheists, humanists, and other secular groups have challenged the 
Inscription Mandate as unconstitutional.
2
 The obvious approach has been to allege that the 
Mandate violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because the government is 
endorsing Christianity, or, at the very least, a monotheistic God.
3
 Courts have consistently 
dismissed such challenges, reasoning that by inscribing “In God We Trust” on currency, the 
United States has not shown a preference for any particular religion but has simply paid homage 
to its religious history.
4
 However, since Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA)
5
 in 1994, challengers have started claiming that the Inscription Mandate violates  
RFRA. Still, so far, these challenges have also failed because courts have found claimants’ 
beliefs to be unreasonable.
6
  
 Nevertheless, there are still strong arguments that the Inscription Mandate violates RFRA 
and the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that courts have 
                                                 
1
 Act of July 11, 1955, ch. 303, Pub. L. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290. The Act is now codified at 31 
U.S.C. §§ 5112(d)(1), 5114(b). 
2
 See Elizabeth Platt, Atheist Challenges “In God We Trust” . . . Again, COLUMBIA LAW 
SCHOOL: PUBLIC RIGHTS PRIVATE CONSCIENCE PROJECT (May 3, 2016), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/publicrightsprivateconscience/2016/01/15/atheist-challenges-in-
god-we-trust-again/ (discussing the various challenges to the Inscription Mandate. 
3
 See id.  
4
 See, e.g.,  Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014). 
5
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). 
6
 See Newdow, 753 F.3d at 107-10 (finding in favor of the defendants in the most recent 
challenge to the Inscription Mandate).  
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“no business” inquiring into the reasonableness of a RFRA plaintiff’s professed belief. 7 
Moreover, the Court in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah explained that a 
law violates the Free Exercise Clause for lack of religious neutrality when the motivation for the 
law is hostility toward a particular religion.
8
 Thus, there are two distinct reasons the Inscription 
Mandate violates the law: (1) Firstly, based on the low bar the Court set for RFRA plaintiffs 
under Hobby Lobby, the Inscription Mandate causes a substantial burden under RFRA
9
; (2) 
secondly, under Lukumi Babalu, the Mandate violates the Free Exercise Clause
10
 for lack of 
religious neutrality because it was motivated by hostility for Atheism during the Cold War.  
 Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of courts’ analyses of previous challenges 
to the Inscription Mandate. Part II provides the jurisprudential development of the Free Exercise 
Clause and RFRA. Part III argues that the Inscription Mandate creates a substantial burden under 
RFRA—based in large part on the Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby. Part IV illustrates Lukumi 
Babalu and provides the framework for analyzing whether a law violates the Free Exercise 
Clause for a lack of neutrality. And Part V argues the Inscription Mandate lacks neutrality and 
therefore violates the Free Exercise Clause because its passage was motivated by hostility for 
Atheism during the Cold War.  
 
I. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE INSCRIPTION MANDATE 
 There have been some attempts to have the inscription of “In God We Trust” 
                                                 
7
 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
8
 508 U.S. 520. 540 (1993). 
9
 I will not address RFRA’s compelling interest or least restrictive means prongs because the first 
and most important showing for challengers to make is the substantial burden. 
10
 I will not address the compelling interest or narrowly tailored prongs that would be triggered 
with a finding that the Inscription Mandate lacks neutrality. The purpose of this Article is simply 
to show the initial infringement, an obstacle which plaintiffs are yet to overcome.  
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removed from U.S. currency.
11
 Michael Newdow, a prominent advocate for the interests 
of Atheists and other secular thinkers, plans to bring a lawsuit in every federal circuit, 
hoping that at least one of the circuits will agree with his position that U.S. currency 
should not bear such inscription.
12
 So far, he has lost these cases in the Ninth and Second 
Circuits, where he has generally argued that the Inscription Mandate violates the 
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and RFRA.
13
 
 In Newdow v. Lefevre, Newdow sued the federal government under the 
Establishment Clause and RFRA.
14
 Newdow represented the First Amendmist Church of 
True Science (FACTS), the members of which are Atheists ‘“whose religious beliefs are 
specifically and explicitly based on the idea that there is no god.’”15 Newdow argued that 
having “In God We Trust” as our national motto and requiring its inscription on currency 
violates the Establishment Clause and RFRA.
16
 Newdow argued that because FACTS 
prohibits members from carrying currency bearing the motto “In God We Trust,” such 
inscription on U.S. currency substantially burdened any religious exercise adherents tried 
to conduct that required cash payments—for example, the “purchase of church attire, 
ingredients for the church libation, and books for the church library; travel for religious 
                                                 
11
 See Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010); Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105 (2d 
Cir. 2014); Complaint, New Doe Child #1 v. The Congress of the United States, (N.D. Ohio 
2016) (5:16-cv-00059). 
12
 See Hermant Mehta, Michael Newdow Has Filed Another Lawsuit to Remove “In God We 
Trust” from U.S. Currency, PATHEOS: FRIENDLY ATHEIST, (May 3, 2016), 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2016/01/12/michael-newdow-has-filed-another-
lawsuit-to-remove-in-god-we-trust-from-u-s-currency/. 
13
 See Lefevre, 598 F.3d at 641; Peterson, 753 F.3d at 107-08. In January of this year, Newdow 
sued once again—this time in the Sixth Circuit—but the court is yet to adjudicate this action. See 
Complaint, New Doe Child #1 v. The Congress of the United States, (N.D. Ohio 2016) (5:16-cv-
00059). 
14
 Lefevre, 598 F.3d at 641. 
15
 Id. at 640-41. 
16
 Id. at 640. 
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purposes to locations that require cash payments; and rais[ing] funds through cash 
donations.”17 The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.18 
 Affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the 
action in its entirety for failure to state a claim.
19
 The Ninth Circuit explained that 
Newdow’s Establishment Clause claim was foreclosed by Aronow v. United States20—a 
case in which the Ninth Circuit held that the inscription of “In God We Trust” on U.S. 
currency “is of a patriotic and ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to a 
governmental sponsorship of religious exercise.”21 Finally, the court dismissed 
Newdow’s RFRA claim, reasoning—rather perplexingly—that there could only be a 
substantial burden if the motto represents purely religious dogma that constitutes a 
government endorsement of religion.
22
 Because the endorsement question was already 
foreclosed by Aranow, the court held that Newdow’s RFRA claim was also foreclosed.23  
 In Newdow v. Peterson, Newdow once again sued to have the inscription of “In 
God We Trust” removed from U.S. currency.24 This time, Newdow made claims under 
the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and RFRA.
25
 Newdow and other 
secular plaintiffs claimed that using the currency violated their religious beliefs because it 
attributed to them a perceived falsehood and forced them to proselytize.
26
 The Second 
Circuit found no Establishment Clause violation, reasoning that the Inscription Mandate 
                                                 
17
 Id. at 645. 
18
 Id. at 639-40. 
19
 Id. 
20
 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970). 
21
 Id. at 243. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Lefevre, 598 F.3d at 646. 
24
 Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014). 
25
 Id. at 106. 
26
 Id. at 109. 
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is not an endorsement of religion, but a ‘“reference to our religious heritage.’”27 Next, the 
court combined the Free Exercise claim with the RFRA claim, thereby providing no 
analysis of how the motto may violate the Free Exercise Clause.
28
 The court found no 
substantial burden under RFRA,
29
 reasoning that the “carrying of currency, which is 
fungible and not publicly displayed, does not implicate concerns that its bearer will be 
forced to proclaim a viewpoint contrary to his own.”30 
 While Newdow has so far failed in two attempts at having “In God We Trust” 
removed from U.S. currency, there is still hope. Circuits other than the Second and Ninth 
may be more receptive to Newdow’s arguments. Moreover, there is a strong argument 
that the Court has overruled the decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits with its 
holding in Hobby Lobby.
31
 But first, this Article must digress. 
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND RFRA 
 An explanation of the historical progression and current state of Free Exercise 
jurisprudence is required before explaining why “In God We Trust” should be removed 
from U.S. currency. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
individuals’ freedom of religious exercise.32 While the Free Exercise Clause originally 
provided robust protection for religious exercise, that protection eroded until 1990, when 
the Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that rules of general applicability 
burdening religious exercise are constitutional so long as they pass rational basis 
                                                 
27
 Id. at 108 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984). 
28
 Id. at 108-09. 
29
 Id. at 109. 
30
 Id. at 109-10. 
31
 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that courts have “no business” looking into the reasonableness 
of a RFRA claimant’s beliefs). 
32
 U.S. CONST. Amend. I.  
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review.
33
 In response to this erosion, Congress passed RFRA in 1994, which provided 
that any law substantially burdening one’s religious exercise can only be justified if the 
government shows that the challenged law is the least restrictive means of advancing a 
compelling government interest.
34
   
A. Free Exercise Cases 
 In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court held that laws burdening religious exercise 
should be reviewed with strict scrutiny.
35
 After Adell Sherbert lost her job because her newfound 
religion prohibited her from working on Saturdays,
36
 South Carolina rejected her application for 
unemployment benefits, reasoning that she failed to accept “suitable” employment that was 
offered to her.
37
 When Sherbert’s challenge to this decision reached the Supreme Court, the 
Court explained that when “the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or 
all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally 
invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.”38 The Court held 
that South Carolina’s disqualification burdened Sherbert’s religious rights by forcing her to 
abandon one of the precepts of her religion to receive the benefits.
39
 Because the Court found no 
compelling interest when it reviewed the statute with strict scrutiny, it held that the statute was 
unconstitutional.
40
 
                                                 
33
 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
34
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (1994). 
35
 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400. 
36
 Id. at 401. 
37
 Id.  
38
 Id. at 404. 
39
 Id. The Court further held that the Unemployment Statute was discriminatory because it 
provided an exception that prevented workers from being disqualified if they refused to work on 
Sundays. Id.  
40
 Id. at 407-08. 
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 In 1972, the Court further bolstered constitutional protection for religious exercise with 
its decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
41
 In Yoder, Amish plaintiffs challenged a Wisconsin statute 
that made high-school attendance compulsory because they believed high-school attendance was 
contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.
42
 Specifically, they believed that sending their 
children to high school would expose them to danger of condemnation by the church community 
and that it would endanger their own salvation and the salvation of their children.
43
 The Court re-
affirmed that strict scrutiny applied to laws burdening religious exercise, stating that “only those 
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to 
the free exercise of religion.”44 The Court recognized the feared impact of making attendance 
mandatory for high school children—that is, although attending secondary school did not 
directly conflict with the Amish religion, it would have a substantial negative impact on the core 
values of the Amish community.
45
 The Court therefore granted the parents an exemption from 
the law.
46
 Significantly, the Court did not find a burden to religion based on any coercion by the 
Wisconsin law; rather, the Court recognized the indirect negative effects that public schooling 
had on the values and culture of the Amish religion.
47
 
 In 1972, the Court in Bowen v. Roy began retreating from its application of strict scrutiny 
for laws burdening religious exercise.
48
 In Bowen, Stephen Roy and his family were denied 
certain welfare benefits when they refused to provide a social security number for their two-year-
                                                 
41
 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
42
 Id. at 209.  
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. at 215. 
45
 Id. at 218. 
46
 Id. at 209.  
47
 Id.; see S. Alan Ray, Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association: Government 
Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 483, 500 (1989).  
48
 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (discussing the Court’s analysis in Yoder).  
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old daughter, claiming that assigning her a social-security number conflicted with their Native 
American beliefs.
49
 The Court departed from the rights-protective standard from Sherbert and 
announced the “coercion test,” which required a claimant proceeding under the Free Exercise 
Clause to demonstrate that the government compelled or coerced the claimant into acting 
inconsistent with the claimant’s religious beliefs.50 The Court then held that Roy could not 
prevail on challenging the government’s use of a social security number to identify his daughter 
because the practice constituted the government’s “internal affairs” and therefore had no effect 
on Roy’s freedom to exercise his religion.51 In dicta, the Court nudged Free Exercise 
jurisprudence even further from the strict scrutiny featured in Sherbert, explaining that a non-
discriminatory law, neutral and uniform in its application, passes constitutional scrutiny if it is a 
“reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.”52 
 Finally, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court significantly limited the reach of the 
strict scrutiny featured in Sherbert.
53
 In Smith, an Oregon statute denied welfare benefits to two 
members of the Native American Church because they had ingested peyote during a religious 
ceremony.
54
 Writing for the Majority,  Justice Scalia announced that Sherbert does not apply to 
laws of general applicability; put differently, the Court announced that Sherbert does not apply 
                                                 
49
 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986). 
50
 Id. at 700 (“The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection against certain forms of 
governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the 
Government's internal procedures.”). 
51
 Id. at 699-700. 
52
 Id. at 707-08. The pendulum swinging away from protection of religious freedom, the Court 
took it a step further in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988), by holding that free exercise challenges to the government land-use decisions required 
application of the coercion test set forth in Bowen. See also Jonathan Knapp, Making Snow in 
the Desert: Defining a Substantial Burden under RFRA, 36 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 259, 273 
(2009). 
53
 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
54
 Id. at 874.  
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to laws that are not “aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”55 Finding that the 
law in question was a law of general applicability, the Court held that the Constitution did not 
require a religious exemption for the two Native American plaintiffs.
56
 While the Court 
attempted to distinguish, rather than overrule Sherbert, the dramatic departure from 
constitutional protection of religious rights prompted a strong response from Congress.
57
  
 The decision in Smith was met with much condemnation.
58
 For example, in an open 
letter, Professors Edward M. Gaffney, Douglas Laycock, and Michael W. McConnell called the 
decision a “sweeping disaster for religious liberty.”59 Congressman Stephen J. Solarz 
admonished the decision, stating, “With the stroke of a pen, the Supreme Court has virtually 
removed religious freedom from the Bill of Rights.”60 Kim Yelton—then-director of government 
relations of Americans United for Separation of Church and State—opined, “There's really no 
such thing as free exercise (of religion) anymore . . . .”61 And Rabbi David N. Saperstein said the 
decision was “the most dangerous attack on our civil rights in this country since the Dred Scott 
decision in the 1850s declared that blacks were not fully human beings.”62 In response to the 
                                                 
55
 Id. at 879, 884-85.  
56
 Id. at 890. 
57
 See Knapp, supra note 52, at 273.   
58
 James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic 
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1992). 
59
 Edward M. Gaffney, Douglas Laycock & Michael W. McConnell, An Open Letter to the 
Religious Community, First Things, March 1991, at 44, 44. 
60
 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 
(1990). 
61
 Robert P. Hey, House to Weigh Bill on Worship, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 26, 1990, at 8 
(quoting Kim Yelton). 
62
 Ed Briggs, Rabbi Deplores Supreme Court Trend on Freedom of Worship, WASH. POST, Oct. 
26, 1991, at B6 (quoting Rabbi David N. Saperstein). 
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overwhelming criticism, four years after Smith, Congress enacted the RFRA, which effectively 
reversed the Court’s decision in Smith.63  
B. Enter RFRA 
 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act begins with congressional findings and 
explanations of RFRA’s purpose.64 Congress explained in RFRA that the Court was incorrect in 
Smith because laws of general applicability may burden religious exercise just as egregiously as 
laws intended to burden religious exercise.
65
 Congress further explained that “the compelling 
interest test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible 
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”66 Finally, 
Congress stated that the purpose of RFRA was to restore “the compelling interest test as set forth 
in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where 
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”67 
 The substantive provisions of RFRA essentially restore the strict scrutiny featured in 
Sherbert.
68
 Specifically, RFRA prohibits the government from (1) substantially burdening a 
person’s exercise of religion, “even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” 
unless (2) the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is “in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and (3) “is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”69 However, RFRA does not include a 
definition of “substantial burden”; rather, the accompanying House and Senate Reports state that 
                                                 
63
 See Knapp, supra note 52, at 278.  
64
 See Knapp, supra note 52, at 279.  
65
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(2), 2000bb(a)(4)-(5) (2006). 
66
 Id.  
67
 Id.  
68
 Id. 
69
 Id.  
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the Judiciary Committee expected courts to look to Free Exercise cases decided before Smith to 
determine whether a claimant’s religious practice was substantially burdened.70    
B. Hobby Lobby  
  The recent Supreme Court case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby illuminates the current 
meaning of “substantial burden” under RFRA. In Hobby Lobby, three for-profit, closely held 
corporations, along with individuals who owned those corporations, sued the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services and other government officials under RFRA.
71
 The plaintiffs sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief from regulations imposed by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).
72
 Believing that life begins at conception and that abortion is 
morally wrong, the plaintiffs alleged that the mandate requiring them to provide health insurance 
covering abortion-inducing drugs substantially burdened their religious exercise under RFRA.
73
 
 The Court had “little trouble” concluding that the ACA mandate caused a 
substantial burden under RFRA.
74
 The Court explained that because the mandate forced 
the plaintiffs to purchase health insurance that covered drugs that could result in the 
destruction of an embryo, the mandate demanded the plaintiffs engage in conduct that 
seriously violated their religious beliefs.
75
 The defendants and the dissent argued that the 
mere act of providing insurance was sufficiently attenuated—and therefore not 
immoral—because the insurance coverage would not itself result in the destruction of an 
                                                 
70
 Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 111, 
103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 8-9 (1993) [hereinafter Senate Report]; House Comm. On the 
Judiciary, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, H. Rep. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 
6 (1993). 
71
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Id. at 2775.  
75
 Id.  
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embryo and that such destruction would only occur if an employee chose to take 
advantage of the insurance and use it for a so-called abortion.
76
 However, the Court 
rejected this argument, emphasizing that courts must not presume to determine the 
plausibility of a particular belief.
77
 The Court thus found that it had to accept the 
plaintiffs’ belief that the insurance coverage was sufficiently connected to the destruction 
of an embryo such that the act of providing the health insurance was immoral and 
therefore a substantial burden.
78
  
 Thus, Free Exercise jurisprudence has come full circle. While the Free Exercise 
Clause used to provide robust protection for religious exercise, that protection was 
greatly diminished in Smith. However, Congress’s enactment of RFRA restored great 
protection for religious exercise, and the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby bolstered its 
protection even more. Consequently, RFRA is now a powerful tool that Atheists can use 
to argue for the removal of “In God We Trust” from U.S. currency. 
III. THE INSCRIPTION MANDATE CAUSES A SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN 
 The Inscription Mandate substantially burdens the religious exercise of Atheists 
and other non-monotheists under RFRA. The Ninth Circuit misanalysed Newdow’s 
RFRA claim in Newdow v. Lefevre because it required an Establishment Clause violation 
as a threshold finding.
79
 Moreover, the Second Circuit misanalysed Newdow’s RFRA 
claim in Newdow v. Peterson because it found that a lack of any compelled speech meant 
there could be no substantial burden.
80
 Further, the Supreme Court’s holding in Hobby 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 2777. 
77
 Id. at 2778. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638, 644-45 (2010). 
80
 Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108-109 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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Lobby effectively overrules both of these decisions because it prohibits courts from 
looking into the reasonableness of RFRA claimants’ professed beliefs.81 
A. Newdow v. Lefevre 
 In Newdow v. Lefevre, the Ninth Circuit did not apply RFRA’s framework but 
instead required an Establishment Clause violation as a prerequisite to a RFRA 
violation.
82
 The court determined that the phrase could not have burdened Newdow’s 
religious exercise unless it was a “purely religious dogma” and constituted a 
governmental establishment of religion.
83
 However, the court had already held in 
Arronow—a prior Establishment Clause case—that the phrase’s inscription on U.S. 
currency is not an establishment of religion.
84
 The court therefore held that Arranow 
foreclosed the possibility that the inscription of the phrase was an establishment of 
religion, and it followed—the court reasoned—that the inscription did not cause a 
substantial burden under RFRA.
85
  
 Contrary to the court’s reasoning, no part of RFRA suggests that courts should 
look into whether a challenged practice constitutes the government’s endorsement of 
religion. On the contrary, the impetus for RFRA was the need for protection from laws of 
general applicability—or, laws having nothing to do with religion—that nonetheless 
burden religious exercise.
86
 Thus, the Ninth Circuit egregiously erred by holding that a 
lack of an Establishment Clause violation foreclosed Newdow’s RFRA claim.87 Indeed, 
                                                 
81
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
82
 Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638, 644-45 (2010). 
83
 Id. at 646. 
84
 Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970). 
85
 Lefevre, 598 F.3d at 644-45. 
86
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb. 
87
 Lefevre, 598 F.3d at 644-46. 
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the Ninth Circuit’s logic would create a framework where an Establishment Clause 
violation would be a threshold requirement for a RFRA challenge, which is certainly not 
what Congress envisioned when it enacted RFRA. 
 Moreover, the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Lefevre in Hobby Lobby.
88
 The 
court in Lefevre found that plaintiffs carrying money inscribed with the phrase “In God 
We Trust” was not immoral—and therefore not a substantial burden to their religious 
exercise—because it was not “purely religious dogma.”89 However, in Hobby Lobby, the 
Supreme Court explained that “federal courts have no business addressing” the question 
of “whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable.”90 Based on this 
principle, the Ninth Circuit had “no business” addressing whether Newdow’s beliefs were 
reasonable. The court therefore erred when it determined that Newdow’s belief—that it 
was immoral to use currency inscribed with “In God We Trust”—was unreasonable 
because the phrase was not purely religious dogma. 
B. Newdow v. Peterson  
 In Newdow v. Peterson, the Second Circuit erred because it erroneously imported 
compelled-speech doctrine into its substantial-burden analysis.
91
 The court focused its 
substantial-burden analysis on whether the law compelled speech—or, whether using currency 
inscribed with the phrase “In God We Trust” compelled plaintiffs to adopt the phrase as their 
own.
92
 Rather than looking at whether the Inscription Mandate burdened religious exercise, the 
court compared it to the statute featured in Wooley v. Maynard—a case where the Supreme Court 
                                                 
88
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
89
 Lefevre, 598 F.3d at 644-46. 
90
 Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2777. 
91
 Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108-109 (2d Cir. 2014). 
92
 Id. 
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held that a statute requiring the phrase “Live Free or Die” on license plates violated the First 
Amendment because it compelled the plaintiffs to profess a political message with which they 
disagreed.
93
 The second circuit distinguished Wooley, explaining that unlike a license plate, 
money is usually carried in a user’s pocket and not displayed to the public.94 The court thus held 
that carrying the currency was not a substantial burden because it did not force Newdow to 
“proclaim a viewpoint contrary to his own.”95 The court was wrong to find that no compelled 
speech meant no substantial burden, as the protections RFRA offers are much broader than mere 
protection from compelled speech. 
  In focusing its brief analysis on compelled speech, the court failed to address all of the 
plaintiffs’ arguments and failed to properly apply RFRA’s framework.96 Specifically, focusing 
on the public’s perception of plaintiffs, the court did not consider the personal effect that the 
currency had on those carrying the money—namely, carrying money was a practice inconsistent 
with their religion because it forced them constantly to encounter a phrase that was the antitheses 
of their religion.
97
 Moreover, the court did not so much as attempt to address Newdow’s 
argument that using the money forced Atheists to proselytize.
98
 Thus, the Second Circuit erred 
because it failed to address various ways in which the plaintiffs’ religious exercise was 
substantially burdened. 
 Further, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision implicitly overruled Peterson.99 In 
Hobby Lobby, the government argued that buying health insurance that covers abortion-inducing 
                                                 
93
 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
94
 Peterson, 753 F.3d at 109. 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. at 108-09. 
97
 Id.  
98
 Id.  
99
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1751 (2014). 
17 
 
drugs is sufficiently attenuated to prevent the abortion from being attributed to the plaintiffs.
100
 
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that courts have “no business” looking into the 
reasonableness of a religious belief.
101
 Similarly, in Peterson, not only did the court inquire into 
the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ beliefs, but the court’s holding hinged on its finding that 
plaintiffs’ beliefs were unreasonable.102 Similar to the government’s erroneous argument in 
Hobby Lobby, the court found that because money constantly changes hands and is typically 
hidden away in a purse or pocket, it is not “readily associated” with a person using it.103 With 
such a tenuous association, the court reasoned, there are no concerns that the bearer of such 
currency “will be forced to proclaim a viewpoint contrary to his own.”104 The court thus erred 
because its reasoning is analogous with the government’s erroneous reasoning in Hobby Lobby.  
 RFRA is one of the most likely means of having “In God We Trust” removed from U.S. 
currency. While two courts have already held that the Inscription Mandate does not substantially 
burden the religious exercise of Atheists, these courts misanalysed the substantial burden 
prong.
105
 Moreover, Hobby Lobby makes the reasoning the courts used to dismiss the claims 
untenable.
106
 In any case, in addition to violating RFRA, the Inscription Mandate also violates 
the Free Exercise Clause because it lacks religious neutrality.  
IV. NEUTRALITY AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
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 A law violates the Free Exercise Clause if it lacks religious neutrality.
107
 The Supreme 
Court found in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah that city ordinances 
violated the Free Exercise Clause because they were motivated by hostility for the Santeria 
religion.
108
 To come to this conclusion, the Court looked at the face of the ordinances, the effect 
of the ordinances, and the overall context in which the ordinances were passed.
109
 The Court held 
that the ordinances were unconstitutional because their lack of neutrality violated the Free 
Exercise Clause.
110
  
A. Lukumi Babalu Factual Background 
  In Lukumi Babalu, the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Santeria 
religion.
111
 The religion teaches devotion to the “orishas,” which are spirits that aid and 
energize individuals to fulfill their individual destiny from God.
112
 One of the principal 
forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice.
113
 Consequently, those practicing Santeria 
sacrifice animals—including chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep, 
and turtles—at various significant life events.114  
 In April of 1987, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye leased land in the city of 
Hialeah, Florida.
115
 The Church announced that it was planning to construct a house of 
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worship, school, cultural center, and museum.
116
 Having faced religious persecution in 
Cuba, the leader of the Church announced his plan to bring the practice of the Santeria 
faith and its ritual of animal sacrifice out into the open.
117
 Though the process was 
somewhat difficult, the Church completed the process of obtaining the necessary permits 
and licensure by early August of 1987.
118
  
 Many members of the Hialeah community found the prospect of a Santeria church 
practicing in their community disturbing.
119
 The city council of Hialeah held an 
emergency public session on June 9, 1987, where it began taking legislative action 
restricting animal sacrifice in the community.
120
 It adopted Resolution 87–66, which 
stated that the citizens had a “concern” that “certain religions may propose to engage in 
practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.”121 
 In September of 1987, the city council passed substantive ordinances that 
effectively prohibited animal sacrifices by those practicing Santeria.
122
 Ordinance 87–52 
defined “sacrifice” as “to kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or 
private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.”123 Then, 
declaring animal sacrifice was inconsistent with public policy,
124
 the city council adopted 
Ordinance 87–71, which provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, persons, 
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corporations or associations to sacrifice any animal” within Hialeah city limits.125  
B. Lukumi Babalu: the Court’s Neutrality Analysis 
 In response to the Ordinances, the Church sued the City of Hialeah and other city 
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their rights under the Free 
Exercise Clause.
126
 When the case finally reached the Supreme Court of the United States 
in 1993, the Court explained that a law that lacks religious neutrality can only be justified 
if it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.
127
 The Court then 
went on to analyze the neutrality of the ordinances in question.
128
  
 The Court First explained some key differences that set the Free Exercise Clause 
apart from the Establishment Clause.
129
 Establishment Clause cases tend to address 
“governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions, and so have dealt with a 
question different . . . from the issue here.”130 Meanwhile, the Court explained, “[a]t a 
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law” is the result of 
hostility toward a particular religion or “discriminates against some or all religious 
beliefs.”131  
 Thus, the core question for the Court was whether the motivation for the 
ordinances was hostility for the religion of Santeria.
132
 The Court explained that there are 
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“many ways of demonstrating that the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of 
religion.”133 To start, the Court explained that it was unclear whether the ordinances were 
facially discriminatory—while they contained the words “sacrifice” and “ritual,” which 
are known to carry a religious connotation, the Court explained that the words could also 
be interpreted to have a secular meaning.
134
 However, the Court then explained that facial 
neutrality is not determinative because the Free Exercise Clause “forbids subtle 
departures from neutrality” and “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.”135 
 The Court next looked at the effect of the ordinances.
136
 The Court explained that 
an adverse impact does not always indicate impermissible targeting of a religion and 
explained that sacrificing animals does implicate “concerns unrelated to religious 
animosity,” such as suffering of animals and health hazards.137 However, the Court found 
that the Ordinances narrowly prohibited animal sacrifices practiced in the Santeria 
religion, but not other animal killings or kosher slaughter.
138
 Thus, the Court explained, 
the ordinances do exhibit animus toward the religion of Santeria because they create what 
is effectively a “religious gerrymander.”139   
 Finally, the Court explained that it could find guidance in its equal protection 
cases when determining whether the object of a law is neutral under the Free Exercise 
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Clause.
140
 Namely, “[r]elevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical 
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the 
enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, 
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking 
body.”141 Looking at this evidence, the Court found that the ordinances were enacted 
“‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’ their suppression of religious practice.”142  
 The Court looked at a variety of factors in reaching this conclusion. The taped 
minutes of the city council’s meetings exhibited “significant hostility” by residents: A 
councilman stated that devotees of the Church ‘“are in violation of everything this 
country stands for,’” while another councilman stated that “‘[t]he Bible says we are 
allowed to sacrifice an animal for consumption . . . but for any other purposes, I don’t 
believe that the Bible allows that.”143 Various other city officials made similar comments: 
The chaplain of the Hialeah police department said that Santeria was a sin, ‘“foolishness,’ 
‘an abomination to the Lord,’ and the worship of ‘demons,’” and he advised, ‘We need to 
be helping people and sharing with them the truth that is found in Jesus Christ.’”144 The 
city attorney said, “‘This community will not tolerate religious practices which are 
abhorrent to its citizens.’”145 Finally, the Court noted that Hialeah made “no attempt to 
address the supposed problem before its meeting in June 1987.”146 After reviewing all the 
evidence, the Court concluded that the object of the ordinances was the “suppression of 
                                                 
140
 Id. at 540 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)). 
141
 Id. at 540. 
142
 Id. at 541. 
143
 Id. 
144
 Id. at 542. 
145
 Id.  
146
 Id. at 541. 
23 
 
religion” because the overall pattern indicated “animosity to Santeria adherents and their 
religious practices,” and it therefore held that the ordinances violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.
147
  
 
V. THE INSCRIPTION MANDATE LACKS NEUTRALITY 
 Like the ordinances in Lukumi Babalu, the Inscription Mandate violates the Free 
Exercise Clause
148
 because it lacks religious neutrality.
149
 The Mandate is discriminatory 
on its face because it invokes religious propaganda by use of words that cannot 
reasonably be read as secular. It is discriminatory in its effect because it denigrates and 
systematically proselytizes Atheists and other non-monotheists. Finally, the historical 
events giving rise to the enactment of the Mandate demonstrate that its enactment was 
motivated by hostility for Atheism.  
A. The Inscription Mandate Lacks Neutrality on its Face 
 In this case, the Inscription Mandate lacks religious neutrality on its face because 
it mandates the use of the phrase “In God We Trust.”150 In Lukumi Babalu, the Court 
found that while the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” generally had a religious connotation, 
it was unclear whether the ordinances containing these words were facially 
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discriminatory because the words could also have a secular meaning.
151
 Therefore, the 
Court was unable to come to a clear conclusion about whether the ordinances lacked 
facial neutrality.
152
 However, unlike the words “sacrifice” and “ritual,” the phrase “In 
God We Trust” cannot reasonably be read to have a secular meaning. While one could 
argue that “God” does not refer to Christianity or any other specific religion, it is 
undeniable that it alludes to, at a minimum, a God featured in a monotheistic religion, 
rather than a polytheistic religion or a religion that believes in no God. Furthermore, the 
phrase taken as a whole not only references God, but also insinuates that “we”—
presumably citizens in the United States who use this money—trust in that God. The use 
of “God” along with an allusion to a belief in that God removes the possibility of 
construing the phrase as secular. Because “In God We Trust” has an undeniably religious 
meaning, the Inscription Mandate lacks neutrality on its face. 
B. The Inscription Mandate Lacks Neutrality in its Effect 
 The effect of the Inscription Mandate is further evidence that it lacks religious 
neutrality. In Lukumi Babalu, the Court found that the effect of the ordinances—a 
religious gerrymander that narrowly prohibited animal sacrifice by those practicing 
Santeria—was evidence that the motivation of the ordinances was animus for the Santeria 
religion.
153
 In this case, the effect of the Inscription Mandate indicates that it lacks 
religious neutrality in two distinct ways. First, it has helped to perpetuate American 
society’s denigration for Atheists. Second, the Mandate actively proselytizes Atheists and 
other non-monotheists.  
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 While the effect of Mandate is not as concretely discriminatory as the ordinances 
in Lukumi Babalu, it nonetheless perpetuates “symbolic boundaries that clearly and 
sharply exclude Atheists in both private and public life.”154 As a result,155 more than half 
of all Americans view Atheists unfavorably,
156
 and, in fact, American society finds 
Atheists to be less trustworthy than rapists.
157
 Interestingly, since 1958—just three years 
after the Mandate was enacted—acceptance for Atheism has not increased as much as 
acceptance of other racial and religious minorities.
158
 While it is impossible to identify a 
direct, causal link between the Mandate and a lack of acceptance for Atheism as 
compared to other racial and religious minorities, it is not a hasty inference to conclude 
that the inscription of “In God We Trust” on all United States currency has contributed to 
the lack of progress.
159
 The negative effect that the Mandate has had on the public’s view 
of Atheists is evidence that it lacks neutrality. 
 Not only does the Inscription Mandate affect the public’s view of Atheism, but it 
burdens Atheists’ religious exercise by pressuring them toward Christianity. The effect of 
the Mandate is to constantly remind all those who use U.S. currency that Americans trust 
in God. Constant affirmation in a belief in God works to alienate and suppress people 
practicing religions with tenets inconsistent with a belief in a single, patriarchal God. 
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While the repressive effect of the Statute is not as tangible or egregious as the effect of 
the ordinances in Lukumi Babalu, it nonetheless demonstrates the nefarious intent to 
suppress the beliefs of Atheists, polytheists, or those who otherwise disagree with the 
phrase. Thus, the proselytizing effect of the Mandate is evidence that it lacks neutrality.  
C. Contextual Evidence Shows a Lack of Neutrality  
 The historical events leading up to and surrounding Congress’s passage of the 
Inscription Mandate are the most compelling evidence showing hostility for Atheism. In 
Lukumi Babalu, the Court explained that when determining whether a law is neutral, 
courts should conduct an “equal protection mode of analysis” that includes a look at “the 
historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events 
leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or 
administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the 
decisionmaking body.”160 The historical context that engendered the first inclusion of “In 
God We Trust” on U.S. coins demonstrates a hostility for Atheism.161 Thereafter, the 
series of events that led to the Mandate’s enactment consisted of escalations of hostility 
for Atheism and communism at the peak of the Cold War. Finally, the legislative record 
and contemporaneous statements made by the decisionmaking body make it abundantly 
clear that animus and hostility for Atheism were the primary motivation for enacting the 
Inscription Mandate. Therefore, like in Lukumi Babalu, the Mandate violates the Free 
Exercise Clause because it lacks religious neutrality. 
A. History of “In God We Trust” on U.S. Currency.  
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 Pro-Christian and anti-Atheist sentiments after the Civil War were the impetus for first 
placing the words “In God We Trust” on U.S. coins. In 1861, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon 
P. Chase received many letters urging a recognition of God on the coins.
162
 Rev. M.R. 
Watkinson—calling himself a “Minister of the Gospel”—wrote seeking “the recognition of the 
Almighty God in some form in our coins.”163 Rev. Watkinson noted to Mr. Chase, “You are 
probably a Christian,” and he claimed that recognition of God on U.S. coins was important to 
“relive us from the ignominy of heathenism.”164 Rev. Watkinson also explained, “From my heart 
I have felt our national shame in disowning God as not the least of our present national 
disasters.”165 Thereafter, a chain of correspondences unfolded that culminated in the Coinage Act 
of 1865, which provided: 
 And be it further enacted, That, in addition to the devices and legends 
upon the gold, silver, and other coins of the United States, it shall be 
lawful for the  director of the mint, with the approval of the Secretary of 
the Treasury, to cause the motto “In God we trust” to be placed upon such 
coins hereafter to be issued as shall admit of such legend thereon.
166
 
 
Thus, after 1865, the the director of the mint had the discretion to have coins engraved 
with “In God We Trust,” but the inscription was not mandatory.167 
 Years later, in 1905, when President Theodore Roosevelt attempted to have the 
phrase removed from U.S. currency, the public’s hostile response illuminated the true 
meaning behind the phrase. Roosevelt considered the inscription of the phrase “an 
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inartistic intrusion and not required by law.”168 President Roosevelt supported omission 
of the phrase, stating, “[T]o put such a motto on coins not only does no good, but does 
positive harm.”169 President Roosevelt’s sentiments were met with great hostility in the 
form of protests from various religious leaders, organizations, and individuals across the 
country.
170
 For example, one clergyman stated, “I have never heard of any body of men 
who believe in the sacred principles of patriotism passing resolutions asking to have the 
sentiment removed, but from my childhood I have heard the blatant protests of infidels 
and unbelievers against this custom.”171 The public outcry demonstrates that the motto’s 
inscription represented pro-Christian, anti-Atheist sentiments, even before the divisive 
events of the Cold War.  
B. Context of the Cold War 
 While the understood meaning behind the inscription at its inception and nascent years is 
relevant, more significant are the events related to the Cold War that unfolded contemporaneous 
to the Inscription Mandate’s passage. The Court in Lukumi Babalu found great evidence of 
hostility for Santeria in “contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking 
body”172 that exhibited “animosity to Santeria adherents and their religious practices.”173 
Similarly, during the Cold War, American governmental and social leaders made a great push to 
distinguish the United States from the Soviet Union.
174
 They did so by vilifying Atheist 
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communism while glorifying the Christianity associated with capitalism. The marginalization of 
Atheism came in various forms—including policy documents, public statements by various 
leaders, and the passage of various religiously charged statutes.  
 The Soviet Union, established by the Bolsheviks in 1924, sought to promote Atheism 
while suppressing Christianity.
175
 Indeed, the Soviet Union had, as an ideological objective, the 
elimination of religion
176
 and sought to replace it with universal Atheism.
177
 Consequently, the 
Soviet Union confiscated religious property from its citizens, harassed and ridiculed believers, 
and advanced Atheism in schools.
178
 After WWII, the Soviet Union was expanding its reach by 
establishing Marxist-Leninist—and thus Atheist—governments in countries such as Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Romania.
179
 Furthermore, Marxist–
Leninists had taken over all of mainland China by 1950.
180
   
 Meanwhile, in the West, the defeat of Nazi tyranny buttressed the widely held 
view that the United States was a righteous nation, under God.
181
 A sense of a crusading 
mission became one of America’s most powerful forms of ideological force in American 
culture after the war.
182
 No one in the West seriously challenged America’s presentation 
of itself as a Christian, God-fearing nation, despite the separation of church and state 
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mandated in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
183
 Consequently, the 
ensuing conflict with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was a particularly Christian 
endeavor, rooted in the belief that America was morally right and that the Soviet 
communists were evil.
184
   
 Indeed, Western leaders sought to create a “Western Doctrine” to be used to 
combat the growing global appeal of communism.
185
 Leaders saw Marxist–Leninist 
Atheism as a focus for undermining the appeal of communist doctrine.
186
 This was 
especially true when it a came to breeding contempt for communism in the eyes of the 
poor—for whom communism was naturally attractive economically—because the poor 
were likely to take comfort and consolation in religion.
187
 As anti-communist rhetoric 
focused on Christian ideals, combined with an emphasis on democracy and freedom, anti-
communism took on a doctrinal status that claimed moral superiority in its religious 
component as opposed to the moral inferiority associated with communism and 
Atheism.
188
 Consequently, Marxist–Leninist Atheism became an ideological vulnerability 
for communism from the West’s religio-political perspective.189  
 Evidence of the United States’ hostility toward Atheism is manifested by various 
government action before and during the Cold War.
190
 Cold War document NSC 68, 
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created by the United States in 1950, marked the beginning of serious arms escalations.
191
 
However, rather than beginning with an introduction summarizing the geopolitical 
situation at the time, NSC 68 began “with the vision of an apocalyptic struggle between 
American good and Soviet evil.”192 NSC 68 stated that America wanted to defeat the 
‘fanatic faith’ of Communism by mobilizing a superior ‘spiritual counter-force’, 
awakening the ‘latent spiritual energies of free men everywhere.”193 Moreover, many 
monographs on U.S. policy featured the word “crusade” in their titles, including crusades 
in China, the Philipines, Vietnam, and Korea.
194
  
 Similar to the pro-Christian, anti-Santeria statements made by city council 
members in Lukumi Babalu,
195
 members of Congress explicitly declared their allegiance 
to Christianity and hostility for Atheism. Senator Edward Martin proclaimed in 1950 that 
“America must move forward with the atomic bomb in one hand and the cross in the 
other.”196 In 1954, Representative Louis C. Rabaut placed in the Congressional Record 
that “[a]n [A]theistic American . . . is a contradiction in terms,”197 and he later stated that 
“[w]e cannot afford to capitulate to the [A]theistic philosophies of godless men.”198 
Representative Peter Rodino stated in 1954 that the religious motto expresses that “we 
wish now, with no ambiguity or reservation, to place ourselves under the rule and care of 
God.”199 Representative Hugh J. Addozio explained in 1954 that “our citizenship is of no 
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real value . . . unless we can open our souls before God.”200 And Representative Charles 
Wolverton wrote in 1954 that those who deny God spread “forces of evil.”201  
 John Foster Dulles, appointed Secretary of State by President Eisenhower in 
1952, was one of the most overtly religious government leaders.
202
 Christianity was 
embedded into Dulles life, as his father was a minister at the First Presbyterian Church in 
Watertown, New York, and he, himself, came close to becoming a minister.
203
 As 
Secretary of State, he clung tightly to the idea that Christianity provided the universal, 
moral law that formed the basis of American political institutions and foreign policy.
204
 
Dulles believed that, in light of the Cold War, the United States needed to rededicate 
itself to God’s will, which was to spread democracy—“Christians,” after all, “are not 
negative, supine people,” said Dulles.205 Dulles also criticized the USSR, claiming that it 
adhered to a “materialistic creed which denies the existence of moral law. It denies that 
men are spiritual beings. It denies that there are any such things as eternal verities.”206 He 
stated in a 1950 radio address, “We need have no remorse. Also we need not despair. We 
have acted as God gave us to see the right.”207  
 Even President Dwight Eisenhower helped perpetuate this religious divisiveness. 
When Eisenhower accepted the Republican nomination for president in 1952, he said, 
“[Y]ou have summoned me . . . to lead a great crusade—for freedom in America and 
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freedom in the world.
208
 He also participated in the American Legion’s “Back-to-God” 
crusade, where he stated: “Recognition of the Supreme Being is the first, the most basic, 
expression of Americanism. Without God, there could be no American form of 
government, nor an American way of life.”209 When the first stamp containing the words 
“In God We Trust” was introduced by way of a 15-minute television and radio program, 
President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Postmaster General 
Arthur E. Summerfield participated, along with leaders from the Jewish, Catholic, and 
Protestant religions.
210
  
 During the time when hostility toward Atheism was at its peak, Congress 
undertook a series of legislative action related to recognizing “God” in different 
contexts. In 1952, Congress instituted a National Day of Prayer.
211
 In June of 
1954, with “Onward Christian Soldiers” playing at the official bill-signing 
ceremony, “Under God” was added to the previously secular Pledge of 
Allegiance.
212
 Congress added the words “under God” to the Pledge of allegiance. 
In 1955, Congress made inclusion of the words “In God We Trust” mandatory on 
all United States coinage and currency.
213
 And, in 1956, Congress replaced “E 
Pluribus Unum” with  “In God We Trust” as the national motto of the United 
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States.
214
  
  Thus, similar to the evidence in Lukumi Babalu, there is overwhelming evidence that the 
Inscription Mandate was motivated by hostility for Atheism. In Lukumi Babalu, the Court found 
that the actions, statements, and overall disposition of the Hialeah community allowed only one 
conclusion—that the Ordinances were motivated by hostility for Santeria.215 Similarly, 
contextual evidence that hostility for Atheism was the motivation for the Inscription Mandate 
comes in the following forms: a long history of American hostility for Atheism, hostile 
statements made by lawmakers and other high-ranking government leaders, hostility manifested 
in various government policy documents, and a series of religiously charged statutes passed 
contemporaneously with the Inscription Mandate. This pervasive evidence of hostility for 
Atheism, along with the fact that the Mandate is facially discriminatory and discriminatory in its 
effect, makes it undeniable that the Inscription Mandate lacks neutrality and therefore violates 
the Free Exercise Clause.  
CONCLUSION 
 Moving forward, it is difficult to see how the Inscription Mandate could survive both a 
RFRA challenge and also a challenge to its neutrality under the Free Exercise Clause. The Court 
in Hobby Lobby ended the practice of courts evaluating the substance of RFRA claimants’ 
beliefs. Therefore, when an Atheist claims that carrying money inscribed with “In God We 
Trust” substantially burdens her religious exercise, courts can no longer tell her she is wrong. 
Moreover, applying the framework provided by the court in Lukumi Babalu, a court should find 
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that the Inscription Mandate was motivated by hostility for Atheism during the Cold War and 
that it therefore violates the Free Exercise Clause.  
